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Abstract
According to the principle of Conjunction Closure, if one has justification for believ-
ing each of a set of propositions, one has justification for believing their conjunction. 
The lottery and preface paradoxes can both be seen as posing challenges for Clo-
sure, but leave open familiar strategies for preserving the principle. While this is 
all relatively well-trodden ground, a new Closure-challenging paradox has recently 
emerged, in two somewhat different forms, due to Backes (Synthese 196(9):3773–
3787, 2019a) and Praolini (Australas J Philos 97(4):715–726, 2019). This paradox 
synthesises elements of the lottery and the preface and is designed to close off the 
familiar Closure-preserving strategies. By appealing to a normic theory of justifica-
tion, I will defend Closure in the face of this new paradox. Along the way I will 
draw more general conclusions about justification, normalcy and defeat, which bear 
upon  what Backes (Philos Stud 176(11):2877–2895, 2019b) has dubbed the ‘easy 
defeat’ problem for the normic theory.
1  Background: The Lottery and Preface Paradoxes
Consider the following principle:
If one has justification for believing each of P1, P2, … , Pn , then one has justi-
fication for believing P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn.
According to this principle, the set of propositions that one has justification for 
believing is closed under the operation of taking conjunctions—we might call it 
Conjunction Closure or, simply, Closure. In one way, the principle seems difficult 
to deny. Suppose I endeavour to believe all and only those propositions for which 
I have justification. If Closure fails, there will be possible situations in which I 
ought to believe each of a series of propositions while refraining from believing 
their conjunction. And yet, it’s unclear how I would actually go about follow-
ing such a recommendation, even if I accepted it. It’s unclear that there is any 
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psychological difference between believing  P1, believing  P2, … believing  Pn and 
believing P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn (see Evnine 1999, section 7; Douven 2002, p. 395). If 
a person has expressed belief in  P1, and in  P2, … and in  Pn we would, without a 
second thought, describe the person as believing P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn.
Suppose I’m filling in a large truth table. If I put a ‘T’ in the  P1 column and a ‘T’ 
in the  P2 column … and a ‘T’ in the  Pn column, you would describe me as believing 
P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn . Even if I hesitated when it came to the final P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn 
column, this wouldn’t obviously make any difference—it would merely look as 
though I don’t know how to complete a truth table for ‘ ∧ ’. One might claim that it 
is, at least, possible to assert each of a series of propositions without asserting their 
conjunction. But even this is unclear. If I assert, in sequence, P1, P2, … , Pn it would 
be natural for you to describe me as having asserted P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn . One could 
insist that, in order to count as asserting the latter, I must literally voice the ‘and’s—
but our ordinary practice of reporting assertions doesn’t appear to support any such 
requirement.
These kinds of points have I think been somewhat neglected in discussions of 
Closure1—but I won’t attempt to expand upon them here. What discussions of Clo-
sure have tended to focus on are certain problems that the principle appears to gen-
erate. Suppose I hold a single ticket—ticket #72—in a fair 100-ticket lottery with a 
single winner. Suppose I know that the lottery has been drawn and I’m yet to hear the 
result, but I already believe that ticket #72 has lost on the grounds that there are 99 
losing tickets and only one winner. It’s plausible that I have justification for believ-
ing this—given my evidence, it is highly likely to be true. But if I have justification 
for believing  (P72) that ticket #72 has lost, I must also have justification for believing 
 (P1) that ticket #1 has lost, and for believing  (P2) that ticket #2 has lost, and so on up 
to  P100. After all, my evidence for each of these propositions is exactly the same. By 
stipulation, I know that one of the tickets has won, in which case I also have justifica-
tion for believing ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 . If Closure holds, I must have justification for 
believing an outright contradiction—P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ P100 ∧
(
̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100
)
.
This is a version of the lottery paradox (Kyburg 1961). The only way to preserve 
Closure, in the face of this paradox, is to insist that I lack justification for believing 
some of  P1,  P2, …,  P100. Since I have the same evidence for each of these propo-
sitions, given a suitable assumption to the effect that justification is a function of 
1 An exception is Evnine (1999). One reason, perhaps, for this relative neglect is that the transition from 
the n propositions P1, P2 … , Pn to the single proposition P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn would seem to involve an 
inference—an instance of Conjunction Introduction—and surely it should be possible, in principle, to 
hold back from drawing an inference. Such a thought is too quick, however. As some theorists have 
observed, the term ‘inference’ tends to be used in two rather different ways in philosophy (Burgess 1981, 
p. 103, Harman 1986, pp. 3–4): Sometimes it is used to mean a kind of psychological process whereby 
one acquires new beliefs, and sometimes it is used to mean an ordered pair consisting of a sequence of 
premises and a conclusion (or perhaps multiple conclusions). But there is no guarantee whatsoever that 
an inference in the latter ‘logical’ sense will always correspond to an inference in the former ‘psychologi-
cal’ sense.
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evidence, it will follow that I lack justification for believing each of  P1,  P2, …,  P100.2 
Perhaps the fact that there is one winning ticket and 99 losers gives me justification 
for believing, of any given ticket, that it is very likely to have lost, but does not give 
me justification for believing that it has lost.
Suppose I have written a book in which I make 100 logically independent fac-
tual claims P1, P2, … , P100 . Suppose each claim has been meticulously checked 
and it is stipulated that I’ve secured justification for believing each one. I’m 
well aware however that I’m fallible and that comparably ambitious books have 
always turned out to contain falsehoods in the past. As a result, I feel compelled 
to write in the preface that there are bound to be some falsehoods in the book. 
Plausibly I have justification for believing this—given my evidence, it’s highly 
likely to be true. But if I have justification for believing ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 
and Closure holds, I must have justification for believing an outright contradic-
tion—P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ P100 ∧
(
̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100
)
.
This is a version of the preface paradox (Makinson 1965). The only way to pre-
serve Closure, in the face of this paradox, is to insist that I lack justification for 
believing ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 . Perhaps the fact that I’m fallible and that carefully 
checked claims occasionally turn out to be false gives me justification for believ-
ing that it is very likely that the book contains falsehoods, but does not give me 
justification for believing that the book does contain falsehoods. Even if we pursue 
this route, however, the preface paradox has a sting in the tail; if Closure is correct 
then not only will I lack justification for believing that P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ P100 is false, 
I will have justification for believing that P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ P100 is true—justification 
for believing that the book is completely falsehood-free. This is a serious cost, as 
many have rightly emphasised (Christensen 2004, chap. 3). Whether accepting this 
is more costly than abandoning Closure is I think less clear—but a topic for another 
occasion.
These two familiar paradoxes are, in a way, opposite sides of the same 
coin. In each case we have a logically inconsistent set of 101 propositions: 
{P1, P2,… , P100,
(
̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100
)
} . In the lottery paradox, it is stipulated that 
I have justification for believing ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 (justification for believing that 
some ticket has won) and it is assumed that I must have justification for believing 
each of P1, P2, … , P100 (justification for believing, of each ticket, that it has lost). 
In the preface paradox, it is stipulated that I have justification for believing each of 
P1, P2, … , P100 (justification for believing each claim in the book) and it is assumed 
that I must have justification for believing ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 (justification for 
2 Some have proposed a view on which one can justifiably believe, of some lottery tickets, that they have 
lost, but one cannot justifiably believe this about too many of the tickets simultaneously (Harman 1986, 
pp. 70–71; Kroedel 2012; see also Douven 2008). This allows us to retain a certain closure principle on 
which, if one has justification for simultaneously believing  P1 and believing  P2 … and believing  Pn, then 
one has justification for believing P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn . The view has significant costs however—whether 
one is justified in believing, of a given lottery ticket, that it has lost will no longer be purely a function of 
the evidence on which the belief is based, but will depend upon how many similar beliefs one has already 
formed. I won’t discuss this view here. One further criticism of this proposed solution to the lottery para-
dox is that it may not extend to the preface paradox (see Eder 2015).
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believing that some of the claims in the book are false). These stipulations should 
be acceptable to all non-sceptics, but the assumptions provide an avenue of response 
for the defenders of Closure.
Put differently: In the lottery paradox, 
(
̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100
)
 is meant to be cer-
tain, but the evidence that I have for believing each of P1, P2, … , P100—the evidence 
that there is one winning ticket and 99 losers—leaves each of these propositions with 
a distinctive kind of uncertainty. By denying that belief can be justified on the basis 
of such ‘purely statistical’ evidence one can avoid the paradox and preserve Closure 
(see, for instance, Ryan 1996; Nelkin 2000; Smith 2010, 2016, section 3.1; Smithies 
2012). In the preface paradox, it is effectively left open what kind of evidence I have 
for believing each of P1, P2, … , P100 , allowing us to fill in the details as we see fit, 
but the evidence I have for believing 
(
̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100
)
 is fixed—it consists in 
the fact that I am fallible and that comparably ambitious books have always turned 
out to contain falsehoods. By denying that belief can be justified on the basis of this 
‘pessimistic inductive’ evidence, one can avoid the paradox and preserve Closure 
(see, for instance, Ryan 1991; Kaplan 2013; Kim 2015; Smith 2016, section 4.1).
In each paradox, a substantial assumption about epistemic justification is 
needed—it isn’t possible to disprove Closure using stipulations alone. Or is it? In 
recent work, a new Closure-challenging paradox has been set out, in somewhat dif-
ferent forms, by Backes (2019a) and Praolini (2019). This paradox, which combines 
elements of the lottery and the preface, relies on no obvious assumptions about epis-
temic justification and appears to resist the familiar Closure-preserving strategies.
2  The Hybrid Paradox
Following Praolini, suppose again that I have secured justification for believing each of 
100 logically independent factual claims P1, P2, … , P100 which I compile in a book. 
Suppose I then send my book manuscript to the Perfectly Omniscient Press for con-
sideration for publication, and am informed by their perfectly omniscient and truth-
ful referee that there is one false claim in the book, providing me with justification for 
believing ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 . If Closure holds, I must have justification for believ-
ing an outright contradiction—P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ P100 ∧
(
̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100
)
 . As in 
the preface paradox, it is simply stipulated that I have justification for believing each of 
P1, P2, … P100—my evidence in favour of these propositions is left unspecified and can 
be filled in as we wish. As in the lottery paradox, it is simply stipulated that I have justi-
fication for believing ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100—this proposition is meant to be certain. As 
a result, this ‘hybrid’ paradox does not appear to rely on any substantial assumptions.3
3 There are some anticipations of this paradox in earlier literature. For instance, the paradox bears a rela-
tion to Ryan’s ‘third version’ of the preface paradox (Ryan 1991, p. 304) in which one receives a defea-
sible report to the effect that one’s book contains a falsehood. She concludes that, if one has genuinely 
secured justification for believing each claim in the book, then one would not be justified in believing 
the report and should simply dismiss it. This closure-preserving strategy is not available in Praolini’s 
case. In the ‘homogeneous preface paradox’ described by Easwaran and Fitelson (2015, section 3) one 
writes a well-researched ambitious factual book arguing precisely that all well-researched ambitious fac-
tual books contain at least one error. In this case, Easwaran and Fitelson suggest that one has something 
much stronger than the usual ‘pessimistic inductive’ evidence to the effect that one’s book contains an 
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In fact, ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 doesn’t quite exhaust the content of the referee’s 
report, as Praolini describes it. In Praolini’s example, the referee reveals not just that 
there is at least one falsehood in the book, but that there is exactly one falsehood 
in the book—which entails, but is not entailed by, ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 . The extra 
content of the report could be captured by making this an exclusive rather than an 
inclusive disjunction.4 The extra content, however, is inessential to the paradox, and 
makes no difference for what follows—with one possible exception which I will note.
As Praolini points out, when I receive the report from the perfectly omnisci-
ent referee, one might think that this serves to defeat my justification for believ-
ing the claims in the book. In this case, when I acquire justification for believ-
ing ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 , I would lose justification for believing P1, P2, … P100 
and there would be no single time at which I have justification for believing all 101 
propositions. While this is one possible way of blocking the paradox, according to 
Praolini it is implausible to think that the referee’s report would defeat my justifica-
tion for everything that I’ve written in the book. Rather than imagining a book with 
a mere 100 claims, Praolini considers a book which contains ‘all and only logically 
independent propositions that you are justified to believe’ (Praolini 2019, p. 720). 
For any set of propositions, there may be many subsets with mutually logically inde-
pendent members, and none of these need be maximal—but suppose we imagine 
a book detailing some suitably large set of logically independent propositions that 
I believe. Now the stakes are even higher. Defeating all of the claims in the book 
would be tantamount to defeating my justified beliefs en masse—and surely the ref-
eree’s report would not have this effect.
Backes (2019a) describes a case that is structurally similar: Suppose I am slipped 
a pill that ensures that some small proportion of the justified beliefs that I form, 
during a certain period, will be false. When the period has elapsed, I learn of the 
pill and its effects, putting me in much the same situation as in Praolini’s example. 
Backes is also aware that Closure could be saved if the information about the pill is 
taken to defeat all of the justified beliefs that I formed during this period—but he too 
regards it as implausible that this information could have such a devastating defeat-
ing effect.5
4 If we simply replace the ‘ ∨ ’s with binary ‘exclusive-or’s then this won’t give us the desired content (no 
matter where we add brackets). We could instead make use of an n-place exclusive-or function which 
returns the value true iff exactly one of its arguments is true. Thanks to Jim Pryor here.
5 Dutant and Littlejohn (2020, section 2) discuss two further examples which have the same structure 
as those described by Praolini and Backes. First, imagine a person undergoing an eye test who is asked 
to identify various letters and numbers on a series of slides. While she is able to answer all of the ques-
tions easily and forms a series of justified perceptual beliefs over the course of the test, she is subse-
quently told by the optometrist that she made one error. Second, imagine a judge who has convicted 
many defendants over her career. Suppose that, in each such case, there was strong incriminating evi-
dence and she justifiably believed the defendant to be guilty. Suppose she is then reliably informed that 
one of the people she has convicted is innocent. Dutant and Littlejohn also consider, and dismiss, the 
possibility that the new evidence from the optometrist or the informant could defeat all of the beliefs that 
error—which, if correct, would give the paradox something like the same character as Praolini’s. In fact, 
I think it’s far from clear that this suggestion is correct—something I will return to in n9.
Footnote 3 (continued)
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For Backes, the lesson of this paradox is that Closure fails. For Praolini, the les-
son of the paradox is that either Closure fails or justification is factive—one can 
only have justification for believing true propositions (see for instance Sutton 2007; 
Littlejohn 2012; Williamson forthcoming). As Praolini points out, if justification 
were factive, then the very set-up of the paradox would be impossible. If I had jus-
tification for believing each of P1, P2, … P100 , and justification were factive, then 
the omniscient, truthful referee couldn’t inform me of ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100—for this 
would be false.
In the next section, I will set out a rather different response to the paradox—one 
that revives the idea that the referee’s report may function as a kind of defeater. The 
first thing to observe is that, in order to block the paradox, it is not necessary that the 
report defeat all of the claims in the book—it is enough that it defeat some. Since 
the report is so general, and fails to single out any individual claims, the idea that it 
would serve to defeat some claims and not others may look like a nonstarter. I will 
argue that this idea is more promising than it first appears.
3  The Principle of Differential Defeat
Suppose I’ve been invited to a drinks reception, and I know that a very eminent, 
world-leading primatologist will be in attendance. In preparation for the event, I arm 
myself with three ‘primate facts’ that I can causally drop into the conversion in case 
the primatologist and I are introduced. First, I read in the current edition of Ency-
clopedia Brittanica that bonobos are capable of passing the mirror self-recognition 
test  (P1). Second, I read in a newspaper article that Madagascar was once home to 
lemurs that were larger than humans  (P2). Finally, a few days before the reception, 
I hear in conversation that the barbary macaque is the only species of old world 
monkey that lacks a tail  (P3). I come to believe each of  P1,  P2 and  P3 and, plausibly, 
I am justified in doing so. At the reception I am introduced to the primatologist and, 
over-eager to impress, I blurt out all three ‘facts’ in quick succession. The prima-
tologist furrows her brow and says ‘I’m afraid something that you just said there is 
wrong’. Before she can elaborate further, however, she is quickly whisked away to 
meet another guest.
How, at this point, should I revise my beliefs? If I accept what the primatolo-
gists says, it’s clear that I can’t just continue to believe each of  P1,  P2 and  P3—that 
would be irrational. One thing I could do is to give up all of these beliefs, and sus-
pend judgment on  P1,  P2 and  P3. This may be a permissible response to my new 
evidence—but, in a way, it seems like an overreaction. After all, my evidence for 
these three propositions is not equal—it’s natural to think that my justification for 
Footnote 5 (continued)
fall within its scope—all of the eye-test beliefs or guilt beliefs. Though I will focus on Praolini’s example 
in the main text, I will have a bit more to say about these examples in n7—and I hope to discuss them at 
length elsewhere.
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believing  P1 is stronger than my justification for believing  P2 which, in turn, is 
stronger than my justification for believing  P3. While the current edition of Encyclo-
pedia Brittanica is a highly reliable source for information about primates, a news-
paper is somewhat less reliable and a snippet of conversation is less reliable still. 
Another permissible response to the new evidence, I suggest, is to retain my beliefs 
in  P1 and  P2 and to give up my belief in  P3. If this suggestion is right, then it is only 
my justification for  P3 that is defeated by the primatologist’s remark—my justifica-
tion for  P1 and  P2 survives.
Turning back to Praolini’s example, if we imagine a book containing most of 
the propositions that I justifiably believe, this will include claims such as ‘Two and 
two is four’ and ‘I am not a turnip’ through to claims such as ‘Edinburgh Waverly 
has the highest annual footfall of any train station in Scotland’ and ‘Oswald acted 
alone‘. When I discover that the book contains a falsehood, it’s highly implausible 
that all of these claims suddenly become equally doubtful. Rather, the claims that 
are made most doubtful by this discovery are the ones that were the most doubtful to 
begin with.
Suppose one has justification for believing each proposition in a set 
{P1, P2, … , Pn} . According to what I will call the Principle of Uniform Defeat, if 
one learns ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn then this will defeat one’s justification for every prop-
osition in {P1, P2, … , Pn} . The Principle of Uniform Defeat does have an initial 
appeal and may be a consequence of principles that some philosophers have explic-
itly endorsed—such as Ryan’s ‘avoid falsity principle’ (Ryan 1996).6 I propose 
instead a Principle of Differential Defeat: If one learns ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn then this 
will defeat one’s justification for all and only those propositions in {P1, P2, … , Pn} 
that were the least justified, prior to the discovery.
Suppose we rank the claims in the book according to how justified they are:
According to the Principle of Differential Defeat, when I learn ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 
this serves to defeat my justification for believing all and only those claims in the 
bottom tier. In this case, when I receive the referee’s report, I lose justification for 
believing  P64,  P39,  P7 and  P90 and the paradox is blocked.
⋮
P76, P12, P82
P19, P71, P4, P96
P50, P31
P64, P39, P7, P90
6 According to the Avoid Falsity Principle, for any competing set of statements L, if one has good reason 
to believe every member of L, and one also has good reason to believe that at least one member of L is 
false or is justified in suspending judgment about whether at least one member of L is false, then one is 
not epistemically justified in believing any of the members of L (Ryan 1996, p. 130). Given Ryan’s defi-
nition of what it is for a set of statements L to be ‘competing’, this appears to be automatically satisfied in 
case one has good reason for believing that at least one member of L is false.
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The Principle of Differential Defeat offers a way of resolving the hybrid para-
dox without abandoning Closure or embracing the claim that justification is factive. 
Praolini is aware of this potential solution to the paradox and offers four replies (see 
Praolini 2019, pp. 722–723), which I will consider in turn. First, Praolini suggests 
that, far from defeating some of the claims in the book, the referee’s report should 
actually increase my justification for each of the claims. Recall that, in Praolini’s 
example, the referee informs me that there is exactly one falsehood in the book and 
no more—and, according to Praolini, this should come as good news. To moti-
vate this, he reiterates some reasoning that is familiar from the preface paradox; 
given that I’m fallible, and there are so many claims in the book, we should expect 
it to contain numerous falsehoods. As a result, to discover that there is only one 
false claim in the book is to discover that things have turned out much better than 
expected, and the discovery should boost my justification for each individual claim. 
As discussed above, this reasoning does have a certain appeal—but it is reasoning 
that a defender of Closure is already committed to rejecting. If Closure holds then, 
prior to receiving the referee’s report, I have justification for believing that there are 
no false claims in the book. As a result, there is at least one sense in which I should 
not ‘expect’ the book to contain numerous falsehoods, and in which the report does 
not represent better news than expected. Praolini’s first reply should, then, leave a 
defender of Closure unmoved—it effectively takes it for granted that Closure fails.
Second, Praolini suggests that, since the referee report fails to specify any par-
ticular claims, it is counterintuitive that it would defeat some claims and not others. 
That is, it is counterintuitive that the referee report should defeat only  P64,  P39,  P7 and 
 P90—even if these do happen to be the least justified in the book. As noted above, 
there is something attractive about this suggestion, but it fails to stand up to scrutiny. 
Even if a defeater weighs equally against each of a set of justified beliefs, the beliefs 
themselves will typically vary with respect to how vulnerable they are to defeat—as 
the above examples illustrate. Broadly speaking, the stronger one’s justification for 
a proposition, the more resistant it is to defeat. The reason that  P64,  P39,  P7 and  P90 
buckle under the strain of the report is not that it weighs extra heavily against them (it 
doesn’t)—it is because these are the claims that are least able to bear the weight.
Third, according to Praolini, it is ad hoc to maintain that the referee’s report only 
defeats the least justified claims in the book, when a conjunction of other claims in 
the book may have an even lower level of justification. That is, it would be ad hoc to 
maintain that the referee’s report defeats the least justified claims  P64,  P39,  P7,  P90 if 
a conjunction of further claims—say, P19 ∧ P71 ∧ P4 ∧ P96—was less justified still. 
I am inclined to think that Praolini’s third reply, like the first, effectively begs the 
question against those who would defend Closure.
Consider the following principle which we might call Comparative Closure:
One’s justification for believing P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn is no weaker than one’s jus-
tifications for believing each of {P1, P2, … , Pn}.
Comparative Closure is a stronger principle than Closure, but the most common 
motivations for accepting the latter would seem to carry over to the former. This 
would certainly seem to be so for the motivation that I sketched at the outset; if 
one automatically counts as believing P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn whenever one believes  P1, 
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believes  P2, … and believes  Pn then this gives us reason to deny, quite generally, that 
one’s epistemic standing with respect to P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn could be worse than one’s 
epistemic standing with respect to each of P1, P2, … , Pn . In any case, defenders of 
Closure are under strong pressure to accept Comparative Closure, which effectively 
rules out the kind of possibility that Praolini envisages.
To pursue this line of thought a little further, it is also very plausible that my 
justification for P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn cannot be any stronger than my justification for 
the least justified member of {P1, P2, … , Pn} . If we combine this with Comparative 
Closure, we can derive the following:
The degree of one’s justification for believing P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn is equal to 
the degree of one’s justification for believing the least justified member of 
{P1, P2, … , Pn}.
We might call this the Minimum Conjunct Rule. Using this rule, we could add con-
junctions to the above ranking as follows:
I will return to this in the next section.
Finally, Praolini points out that, if the referee report defeats the least justified 
claims in the book, and the claims all happened to be equally justified, then they 
would all be defeated. This result is, indeed, unavoidable—if the propositions in a 
set are equally justified, then the Principle of Differential Defeat and the Principle of 
Uniform Defeat will make exactly the same predictions. Such a case would, however, 
be very different from what Praolini initially asks us to imagine. Suppose I’m looking 
at a row of cereal boxes on a supermarket shelf. Presumably I’m justified in believ-
ing, of each box, that it contains cereal. Suppose I then learn that one of the boxes 
is empty and has been placed on the shelf by mistake. This appears to be a case in 
which I learn that one amongst a set of equally justified propositions is false. After 
all, I have no more reason to think that any one box contains cereal than any other—I 
can’t tell this just by looking. In this case, though, it is plausible that the new evidence 
would serve to defeat my justification for believing each proposition in the set. That 
is, it’s plausible that I would no longer be justified in believing, of any one box, that 
it contains cereal—not without picking it up or looking inside. Even if we find the 
idea of en masse defeat implausible when it comes to Praolini’s original example, we 
should not assume that this intuition will persist when the example has been adjusted 
in such a way as to ensure that all of the beliefs in question are equally justified.7
⋮
P76, P12, P82… P76 ∧ P12 ∧ P82
P19, P71, P4, P96… P19 ∧ P71 ∧ P4 ∧ P96
P50, P31… P50 ∧ P31
P64, P39, P7, P90… P64 ∧ P39 ∧ P7 ∧ P90
7 Dutant and Littlejohn’s eye test example may be another case in which one learns that one amongst a 
set of equally justified beliefs is false. The way that Dutant and Littlejohn describe it, the beliefs that the 
examinee forms about the letters and numbers on the eyecharts are equally sound from her own perspec-
tive, and she has no reason to regard any one as more doubtful than any other. If these beliefs are equally 
justified, the Principle of Differential Defeat predicts that they will all be defeated by the optometrist’s 
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In any event, defenders of Closure may have a particular reason for tolerating en 
masse defeat in cases of this kind. If I have equal justification for each of a series of 
claims and I learn that exactly one of them is false, then the situation that I confront 
is very similar to that presented by the lottery paradox. Both situations involve a 
large set of propositions, each of which is very likely to be true but one of which 
is sure to be false. In both situations, the propositions are on a par, in that any one 
could be the false proposition just as easily as any other. Indeed, if we wrote each of 
the claims down on slips of paper, then there would be one ‘winning ticket’, which 
featured the one false claim, and a multitude of ‘losing tickets’, which featured the 
true claims. To believe any particular claim would be tantamount to believing, of 
one particular ticket, that it’s a loser. For a defender of Closure, accustomed to deny-
ing that one can justifiably believe, of a single ticket, that it has lost a fair lottery, 
embracing en masse defeat in this situation is, I think, a small step. I will have a bit 
more to say about these sorts of cases in the final section.8
In this section I have provided a prima facie motivation for the Principle of Dif-
ferential Defeat, and argued that this principle will allow us to preserve Closure in 
the face of the hybrid paradox. It remains to be shown that there is a viable theory of 
justification that will vindicate both Closure and the Principle of Differential Defeat. 
I turn to this next.
4  The Normic Theory
In both the lottery and the preface paradoxes, we are invited to infer that I have jus-
tification for believing a proposition from the premise that it is highly likely, given 
my evidence. In the lottery paradox the proposition in question is that ticket #72 
has lost, while in the preface paradox the proposition in question is that the book 
Footnote 7 (continued)
revelation. (Unless the optometrist’s words are themselves thought to be open to doubt, in which case 
the examinee faces a more complex epistemic situation akin to Ryan’s third version of the preface para-
dox discussed in n3. I return to this kind of situation in n16). It is worth noting that Dutant and Little-
john’s judge example is quite different in this regard. One could not simply stipulate that the judge’s guilt 
beliefs are all equally justified without considerably altering the case and making it far more contrived 
than what one would naturally imagine. In fact, even in the eye test example, the stipulation of equal 
justification may not be altogether natural—see https ://www.ismp.org/resou rces/misid entifi cati on-alpha 
numer ic-symbo ls. Thanks here to Philip Ebert.
8 Another kind of situation which might be thought problematic for the Principle of Differential Defeat 
is one in which all of the propositions in a set are equally justified save for one, which has a higher 
degree of justification than the others. If I learn that some member of the set is false, the Principle of 
Differential Defeat predicts that this one proposition will survive, while the remainder are all defeated. It 
might seem odd, though, that I should retain justification for believing this proposition alone—particu-
larly if my initial justification for believing it was only slightly higher than my justification for believing 
the others. This kind of example raises questions about the granularity of justification—questions about 
how finely we can differentiate different levels of justification. I will return to this in n13 and n17.
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contains falsehoods. The inference is a very tempting one. After all, most episte-
mologists are fallibilists who agree that one can have justification for believing a 
proposition even if one’s evidence doesn’t make it completely certain. But what else 
can we require, then, except that one’s evidence make the proposition likely? What 
else could the evidence do?
On reflection, I think that there is something else that the evidence might do. 
Sometimes our evidence in favour of a proposition P is such as to make the falsity of 
P abnormal in the sense of requiring special explanation. Suppose I wander into a 
room I’ve never been in before and notice that the wall before me appears to be red. 
Clearly this evidence makes it very likely that the wall before me really is red—but 
this is not its only effect. If the wall appears to me to be red, but it isn’t red, then 
there would have to be some explanation as to how this came to be—I’m undergo-
ing a colour hallucination, the wall is illuminated by hidden red lights, I’ve suddenly 
been struck by colour blindness etc. Whatever the case, there has to be more to the 
story—it can’t ‘just so happen’ that the wall appears to me to be red, but isn’t red.
In contrast, the fact that there are 99 losing tickets and only one winner doesn’t 
generate the need for special explanation in the event that ticket #72 is the winner. 
If ticket #72 were to win, then I may be surprised and delighted (it is my ticket after 
all)—but I wouldn’t seek some special explanation as to how this could possibly 
have happened. Some ticket has to win the lottery and it might just as well be ticket 
#72 as any other. Although it would be very unlikely, there is a sense in which there 
would be nothing abnormal about this ticket being the winner (Vogel 1990).
More controversially, the fact that I’m fallible and that comparably ambitious 
books have always contained falsehoods in the past does not generate the need for a 
special explanation in the event that my book turns out to be falsehood-free. Once 
again, if this were the case then I may be surprised and delighted—but I wouldn’t 
demand an explanation as to how this could possibly have happened. Recall that 
every claim in the book has been thoroughly researched and checked—and it 
could just turn out that my research has delivered the right result every time. Why 
shouldn’t it? Although it would be very unlikely for every claim in the book to be 
true there is, once again, a sense in which there would be nothing abnormal about 
this turn of events.
Sometimes when we describe a situation as ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ we are simply 
making a claim about frequencies—a normal situation is one that frequently arises, 
while an abnormal situation is one that is infrequent. If this is our understanding of 
normalcy, then we should say that it would be abnormal for ticket #72 to win or for 
my book to be error free. This is not the only way that we use these terms however. 
If the lights in my house suddenly start to flicker, or my car fails to start when I turn 
my key in the ignition and I remark ‘that’s not normal’, I’m not just pointing out that 
this is something rare or infrequent—part of what I’m saying is precisely that there 
needs to be some special explanation for what is occurring.
Say that evidence E normically supports a proposition P just in case, given E, 
the situation in which P is false would be abnormal in the sense of requiring special 
explanation (Smith 2010, 2016, 2018). The evidence that the wall appears to be red 
normically supports the proposition that the wall is red. The evidence that there are 
99 losing tickets and one winning ticket does not normically support the proposition 
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that my ticket has lost. The fact that I’m fallible and that comparable books have 
always turned out to contain falsehoods in the past does not normically support the 
proposition that my book contains a falsehood.
According to the normic theory of justification, one has justification for believ-
ing a proposition P just in case one’s evidence normically supports P. In the lot-
tery paradox, the normic theory predicts that I lack justification for believing, 
of any ticket, that it has lost the lottery—I lack justification for believing any of 
P1, P2, … , P100 . In the preface paradox, the normic theory predicts that I lack jus-
tification for believing that the book contains a falsehood—I lack justification for 
believing ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100.9 Not only does the normic theory offer a way of pre-
serving Closure in the face of the lottery and preface paradoxes—it would appear to 
deliver a general validation of the principle: Suppose one has justification for believ-
ing  P1, justification for believing  P2, …, justification for believing  Pn. According to 
the normic theory, given one’s evidence E, there would have to be a special explana-
tion if  P1 were false and there would have to be a special explanation if  P2 were false 
… and there would have to be a special explanation if  Pn were false. What about 
P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn ? If P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn were false, then at least one of P1, P2, … , Pn 
would have to be false. Therefore, given one’s evidence E, there would have to be a 
special explanation if P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn were false and, according to the normic the-
ory, one has justification for believing P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn (Smith 2018, p. 3870). The 
claim that the normic theory validates Closure will also permit of a more rigorous 
proof—given a certain formal development of the notion of normic support—which 
I will outline in the next section.
The normic theory can be easily extended to justification comparisons. Say that 
E normically supports proposition P more strongly than proposition Q just in case, 
given E, the situation in which P is false is less normal, in the sense of requiring 
more explanation, than the situation in which Q is false. According to the normic 
theory, one has more justification for believing P than Q just in case one’s evidence 
normically supports P more strongly than Q. Given this, it is plausible that the nor-
mic theory will serve to validate Comparative Closure and the Minimum Conjunct 
Rule: To explain the falsity of P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn one must explain either the falsity 
of  P1 or the falsity of  P2, … or the falsity of  Pn. Given one’s evidence E, the amount 
of explanation required by the falsity of P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn is equal to the amount 
of explanation required by the falsity of  P1 or the falsity of  P2, … or the falsity of 
 Pn, whichever is least. According to the normic theory, the degree of justification I 
have for believing P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn is equal to the degree of justification I have for 
9 In the ‘homogeneous preface paradox’ discussed in n3, we are asked to imagine an author who writes 
a well-researched ambitious factual book in which he argues precisely that all well-researched ambitious 
factual books contain falsehoods (Easwaran and Fitelson 2015, section 3). Though we are not told pre-
cisely how the author proceeds, it’s natural to imagine this book as listing a series of well-researched 
ambitious factual books, along with the falsehoods that they have been found to contain. If that’s right, 
then it’s clear that this evidence does not normically support the conclusion that all well-researched, 
ambitious factual books contain at least one falsehood or that the author’s own book contains at least one 
falsehood—it doesn’t generate the need for a special explanation in the event that the author’s book is 
falsehood-free. From the perspective of the normic theory, the homogeneous preface paradox presents no 
greater challenge than the original.
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believing the least justified of P1, P2, … , Pn . This somewhat casual demonstration 
can, once again, be substituted for a more formal proof, which I will detail in the 
next section.
Normic support is defeasible. Just because a given body of evidence provides 
normic support for a proposition, it doesn’t automatically follow that an expanded 
body of evidence will do so. Suppose again that I wander into a room and notice 
that the wall before me appears to be red. Given that the wall appears to be red, there 
would have to be a special explanation in the event that the wall is not red. Suppose 
I then discover that the wall is illuminated by hidden red light such that it would 
appear to be red even if it were white. Given that the wall appears to be red and is 
illuminated by hidden red light, there would not need to be a special explanation in 
the event that the wall is not red—the new evidence, in effect, removes the need for 
explanation in this case. If E normically supports P, we can say that D defeats the 
normic support for P just in case E ∧ D does not normically support P.
We can now pose the following question: Suppose a body of evidence E pro-
vides normic support for each proposition in a set {P1, P2, … , Pn} . What does 
E ∧
(
̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn
)
 normically support? That is, what is the defeating effect 
of learning ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn ? If the normic theory is to deliver the Principle of 
Differential Defeat, then learning ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn must defeat the normic support 
for all and only those propositions in {P1, P2, … , Pn} that were the least normically 
supported by E. It is far from obvious, however, that this is so. On the contrary, one 
might think that learning ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn should serve to defeat the normic sup-
port for all of the propositions in {P1, P2, … , Pn} (giving us instead the Principle 
of Uniform Defeat) as it would remove the need to explain the falsity of any one of 
P1, P2, … , Pn . In the next section, I will argue that this hasty reasoning is mistaken. 
In order to do so, we will need to start thinking about normic support in a more for-
mal way.
5  Normal Worlds
Suppose propositions can be ordered according to their normalcy—according to 
how much explanation their truth would require. Normic support can be analysed in 
terms of comparative normalcy relations amongst propositions: E normically sup-
ports P just in case E ∧ P is more normal than E ∧ ̃P , and E normically supports P 
more strongly than Q just in case E ∧ ̃Q is more normal than E ∧ ̃P . Given these 
definitions, the formal features of normic support will be determined by the formal 
features of the normalcy ordering of propositions.
Consider a set of propositions F, which is partially ordered by entailment, closed 
under disjunction and negation and which contains a ‘maximal’ proposition which 
is entailed by all propositions in the set and a ‘minimal’ proposition which entails 
all propositions in the set. The maximal proposition can be thought of as a tautol-
ogy or logical truth and the minimal proposition as a contradiction or logical false-
hood. If the set of propositions F is infinite, we suppose also that it is closed under 
infinite disjunction. I assume that all propositions in F can be compared for their 
normalcy—for any two propositions, either one is more normal than the other or 
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they are equally normal. That is, I assume that, for any two propositions in F, either 
the truth of one requires more explanation than the truth of the other, or their truth 
requires the same amount of explanation.
The maximal proposition should count as maximally normal and the minimal 
proposition as maximally abnormal. The truth of a tautology never requires explana-
tion, and nothing could require more explanation than the truth of a contradiction. 
A disjunction will be as normal as its most normal disjunct. The only way in which 
P ∨ Q can be true is if either P is true or Q is true. To explain the truth of P ∨ Q 
is to explain either the truth of P or the truth of Q, and the amount of explanation 
demanded by P ∨ Q will be equal to the amount demanded by P or by Q, whichever 
is less.
If we are considering an infinite F, I also assume that there are no infinite ascend-
ing chains of increasingly normal propositions. In this case, any set of propositions 
will be guaranteed to have maximally normal members and we can extend the above 
principle to infinite disjunctions—the disjunction of any (potentially infinite) set 
of propositions is as normal as its most normal members. With this assumption in 
place it will be possible to rank propositions according to how normal they are: The 
rank 1 propositions will be the most normal ones in F. Once these are removed, the 
rank 2 propositions will be the most normal ones amongst those that remain, and so 
on. The least normal propositions in F—those that are just as abnormal as the mini-
mal proposition—might be assigned an infinite rank.10
Given a few further assumptions, a proposition P can be modelled as a set of pos-
sible worlds—namely, the set of possible worlds at which P is true. In this case, F 
will be modelled by the subsets of a set of possible worlds W, with W itself serving 
as the maximal proposition and the empty set ∅ serving as the minimal proposi-
tion.11 Disjunction will be modelled as set theoretic union and negation will be mod-
elled as complementation in W. Given a normalcy ranking of propositions, we can 
derive a normalcy ranking of worlds: Let the normalcy rank of a world w be equal to 
the normalcy rank of the least normal proposition of which it is a member. That is, 
let the normalcy rank of w be equal to the normalcy rank of the least normal propo-
sition that is true at w. The rank 1 worlds will be those that are members of only 
10 If F is infinite, there may be propositions which are not the maximally normal members of any set 
reached after a finite number of steps. In this case, the most normal members of F, once all propositions 
with finite ranks have been removed, might be assigned, as their rank, the first transfinite ordinal ω. At 
this point, the process can begin anew; once these propositions are removed, the most normal amongst 
the remainder can be assigned rank ω + 1 and so on. There may still be propositions that are not the 
maximally normal members of any set reached by a finite number of such further steps, in which case 
we can assign propositions to the rank ω.2. In this way, we can reach further limit ordinal ranks—, ω.3 
… ω2… ω3 … and we could consider uncountable ordinal ranks as well, if F is taken to be uncount-
ably large. Though the formalism allows for transfinite normalcy ranks, it is unclear whether they can be 
made intelligible by the informal interpretation of normalcy in terms of the need for explanation. In any 
event, in the main text I restrict attention to cases in which all propositions can be assigned either a finite 
normalcy rank, or the single infinite rank representing maximal abnormality.
11 If F is finite, it is guaranteed to be isomorphic to the power set of a set W. If F is infinite then, in addi-
tion to the assumptions already tabled, we must assume that it contains atoms—propositions which are 
distinct from the minimal proposition and entailed only by the minimal proposition and by themselves—
and that every proposition, save the minimal proposition, is entailed by some atom.
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rank 1 propositions. The rank 2 worlds will be those that are members of only rank 1 
and rank 2 propositions, and so on. Given this definition, as can be checked, the rank 
of a proposition must be equal to the rank of the most normal worlds within it—the 
rank of the most normal worlds at which it is true.12
E normically supports P just in case E ∧ P is more normal than E ∧ ̃P . This is 
just to say that the most normal E ∧ P-worlds are more normal than the most normal 
E ∧ ̃P-worlds or, more simply, that P is true at the most normal E-worlds. Normic 
support can, then, be analysed in terms of variably strict quantification over pos-
sible worlds: E normically supports P just in case P is true at all of the most normal 
worlds at which E is true. Imagine the worlds at which E is true as points arrayed in 
space with proximity to a central point serving as a metaphor for normalcy. We can 
visualise worlds arranged in a series of concentric spheres radiating from that cen-
tral point, as in Fig. 1.
The innermost sphere represents the E-worlds that are most normal, the next 
sphere incorporates the E-worlds that rank next in terms of normalcy and so on. 
Figure 1 depicts a situation in which E provides normic support for  P2 but fails to 
provide normic support for  P1.
This analysis of normic support offers a new perspective on Closure and the nor-
mic theory. If E normically supports each proposition in the set {P1, P2, … , Pn} 
then E normically supports P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn . Proof Suppose E normically supports 
each proposition in the set {P1, P2, … , Pn} . In this case,  P1 is true in all of the most 
normal E-worlds and  P2 is true in all of the most normal E-worlds … and  Pn is true 
in all of the most normal E-worlds. It follows immediately that P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn 
is true in all of the most normal E-worlds in which case E normically supports 
P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn . □ The normic theory of justification validates Closure.
E normically supports P more strongly than Q just in case E ∧ ̃Q is more normal 
than E ∧ ̃P . This is just to say that the most normal E ∧ ̃Q-worlds are more normal 
than the most normal E ∧ ̃P-worlds. If Fig. 2 represents, once again, the normalcy 
ranking of E-worlds, it depicts a situation in which E provides normic support for 
each of  P1,  P2 and  P3, but stronger normic support for  P3 than  P2 and stronger nor-
mic support for  P2 than  P1. The most normal E-worlds in which  P1 is false are in the 
second sphere, the most normal E-worlds in which  P2 is false are in the third sphere 
and the most normal E-worlds in which  P3 is false are in the fourth sphere.
We might define the degree to which E normically supports a proposition P as 
the number of normalcy spheres of E-worlds throughout which P holds. Given this 
definition, E normically supports P more strongly than Q just in case it normically 
12 Once propositions are modelled as sets of possible worlds, the assumption that there cannot be infi-
nite ascending chains of increasingly normal propositions is equivalent to the assumption that any set 
of worlds must have maximally normal members. Lewis (1973, section  1.4) famously considers and 
rejects a corresponding assumption for world similarity—which he terms the ‘limit assumption’—though 
his reasons don’t straightforwardly carry over to the case of world normalcy. Without this assumption, 
neither propositions nor worlds could be assigned numerical normalcy ranks—but we would retain the 
capacity to make normalcy comparisons. This looser framework would in fact still suffice for the core 
aims of this section—namely, to establish that the normic theory of justification will deliver both Closure 
and the Principle of Differential Defeat—but the details are omitted here. For further discussion of these 
issues, see Smith (2016, chap. 8).
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supports P to a higher degree than Q. In Fig. 2, E normically supports  P1 to degree 
1,  P2 to degree 2 and  P3 to degree 3.13
Fig. 1  P2 is normically supported, while  P1 isn’t
Fig. 2  P3 is normically supported more strongly than  P2, which is normically supported more strongly 
than  P1
13 According to the normic theory (when formally developed in the way suggested here) degrees of jus-
tification, unlike of degrees of probability, are discrete. While the probability of two propositions can be 
brought arbitrarily close, while one remains more probable than the other, two propositions that differ in 
their degree of justification must be at least a whole step apart. This has some relevance for the kind of 
situation imagined in n8, in which one has equal justification for every proposition in a set apart from a 
single proposition for which one’s justification is ‘slightly’ higher. If one learns that some proposition in 
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The degree to which E normically supports a conjunction P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn is 
no lower than the degree to which it supports each of P1, P2, … , Pn . Proof Any 
world in which P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn is false is a world at which either  P1 is false or 
 P2 is false … or  Pn is false. Let w be one of the most normal worlds at which E 
is true and P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn is false. There must be some  Px ∈ {P1, P2, … , Pn} 
such that  Px is false at w. It follows that the degree to which E normically supports 
P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn is no lower than the degree to which it normically supports  Px. □ 
The normic theory of justification validates Comparative Closure. As can be easily 
checked, if  Px ∈ {P1, P2, … , Pn} is false at some of the most normal worlds in which 
E is true and P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn is false, then the degree to which E normically sup-
ports P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn will in fact be equal to the degree to which E normically 
supports  Px and, more generally, equal to the degree to which E supports the least 
supported members of {P1,  P2, …,  Pn}. As a result, the normic theory of justification 
validates the Minimum Conjunct Rule.14
If E normically supports P, D defeats this normic support just in case E ∧ D does not 
normically support P. In this case, while P is true in all of the most normal E-worlds, P 
is false in some of the most normal E ∧ D-worlds. D, in effect, forces us further from 
the most normal worlds in which E is true, and into a region in which the connection 
between E and P is disrupted. If Fig. 3, once again, represents the normalcy ranking 
of E-worlds, it depicts a situation in which E provides normic support for P that is 
defeated by D. With evidence E, I have normic support for all and only those proposi-
tions that contain the red region—including P. Once I learn D, I then have normic sup-
port for all and only those propositions that contain the yellow region.15
the set is false then, according to the Principle of Differential Defeat, all of the propositions in the set will 
be defeated, aside from the one proposition that is more justified than the others. But what if even a single 
degree of justification always represents a substantial difference? The formal framework developed here is 
compatible with there being a limited number of possible degrees that justification could have. And, even 
if an infinite number of degrees is permitted, the framework can still be construed in such a way that every 
degree indicates a significant shift from its predecessor. These points may allay (though perhaps not alto-
gether answer) our concerns over what the Principle of Differential Defeat predicts in a case like this.
Footnote 13 (continued)
14 The Minimum Conjunct Rule corresponds to one of the axioms for a positive ranking function (Spohn 
2009, section 2.1, 2012, section 5.2). A function r taking propositions in F into the set of natural numbers 
plus infinity will qualify as a positive ranking function just in case:
(1)  r(W) = ∞
(2)  r(∅) = 0
(3)  r(P ∧ Q) = min{r(P), r(Q)}
 In case F is infinite, (3) may be strengthened to:
(4)  For any set of propositions Σ, r(∧Σ) = min {r(P) | P ∈ Σ}
 A positive ranking function that satisfies (4) is referred to as ‘completely minimative’. The degrees of 
normic support conferred upon propositions by a body of evidence will conform to these axioms (Smith 
2016, chap. 8, 2018, section 4). If, as discussed in n10, we assign propositions to transfinite ordinal nor-
malcy ranks, degrees of normic support should also be capable of taking such values. In this case, the 
above axioms can stand, with ∞ interpreted as a kind of ‘absolute infinity’ greater than any ordinal, giv-
ing us something close to Spohn’s conditional ordinal functions (Spohn 2012, pp. 72–73).
15 There is a clear connection between the effect of defeat, according to the normic theory, and the effect 
of adding conflicting information to a belief set, according to belief revision theory. On Grove’s possible 
worlds model of AGM belief revision theory, a belief set is represented by a set of possible worlds—the 
worlds at which all of the beliefs in the set are true—and is associated with a system of spheres which 
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Figure 3 depicts a situation in which D defeats E’s normic support for P.
Consider now Fig. 4 (a technicolour version of Fig. 2).
Before I acquire any defeating information, I have normic support for all and only 
those propositions that contain the red region—a set which includes  P1,  P2 and  P3. If 
I learn ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨ ̃P3 , the most normal worlds that are compatible with my expanded 
evidence will be those in the yellow region, and I will have normic support for all 
and only those propositions that contain this region—a set which no longer includes 
 P1, but continues to include  P2 and  P3. If I learn ̃P2 ∨ ̃P3 , the most normal worlds 
compatible with my further expanded evidence will be those in the purple region, 
and I will have normic support for all and only those propositions that contain this 
region—a set which no longer includes  P2, but still includes  P3.
When I learn ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨ ̃P3 this serves to defeat my normic support for the least 
normically supported of the three propositions—P1. When I learn ̃P2 ∨ ̃P3 this 
serves to defeat my normic support for the least normically supported of the two 
remaining propositions—P2. Suppose my evidence E provides normic support for 
each proposition in the set {P1, P2, … , Pn} and suppose I learn ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn . 
We prove in two stages the general claim that this serves to defeat the normic 
support for all and only those propositions in {P1, P2, … , Pn} that are least nor-
mically supported by E. First, for any proposition  Px ∈ {P1, P2, … , Pn} if there 
is another proposition in {P1, P2, … , Pn} that is less normically supported by E, 
then ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn does not defeat the normic support for  Px. Proof Suppose 
 Px ∈ {P1, P2, … , Pn} and there exists another proposition  Py ∈ {P1, P2, … , Pn} 
that is less normically supported than  Px by evidence E. In this case, there is a 
world in which E is true and  Py is false which is more normal than the most nor-
mal worlds in which E is true and  Px is false. Since  Py ∈ {P1, P2, … , Pn} , there 
Fig. 3  D defeats the normic support for P
Footnote 15 (continued)
orders the remaining worlds with respect to their ‘closeness’ to that belief set. If, in Fig. 3, we interpret 
the spheres as representing closeness to the belief set B represented by the red region then, on Grove’s 
model, the yellow region will represent the new belief set that results from the addition of D to B (see 
Grove 1988, section 2, partic. p. 162). I won’t explore this connection further here.
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is a world in which E and ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn are true which is more normal 
than the most normal worlds in which E is true and  Px is false. Ipso facto,  Px is 
true in the most normal worlds in which E and ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn are true and 
E ∧
(
̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn
)
 normically supports  Px. □
We can also prove the converse claim: For any proposition  Px ∈ {P1, P2, … , Pn} 
if there is no other proposition in {P1, P2, … , Pn} that is less normically supported 
by E then ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn does defeat the normic support for  Px. Proof Sup-
pose  Px ∈ {P1, P2, … , Pn} and there exists no other proposition in {P1, P2, … , Pn} 
that is less normically supported than  Px by evidence E. In this case there are 
no worlds at which E and ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn are true and which are more normal 
than the most normal worlds at which E is true and  Px is false. Ipso facto,  Px is 
false at some of the most normal worlds at which E and ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn are 
true and E ∧
(
̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn
)
 does not normically support  Px. □
If one’s evidence E provides normic support for each proposition in the set 
{P1, P2, … , Pn} then ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn defeats the normic support for all and only 
those propositions in {P1,  P2, …,  Pn} which were the least normically supported by 
E. According to the normic theory of justification, if one has justification for each 
proposition in the set {P1, P2, … , Pn} and one learns ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn , this new 
evidence serves to defeat all and only those propositions in {P1, P2, … , Pn} that 
were the least justified by E. The normic theory of justification delivers the Principle 
of Differential Defeat. In the hybrid paradox, the normic theory predicts that, when I 
learn that the book contains an error—when I learn ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100—this will 
Fig. 4  P3 is normically supported more strongly than  P2, which is normically supported more strongly 
than  P1 (with coloured regions of defeat)
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serve to defeat all and only those claims in the book that were the least justified—the 
least justified members of {P1, P2, … , P100}.16
When accommodating new evidence, according to the normic theory, one is only 
required to take seriously the most normal ways in which the new evidence could 
be true, given one’s prior evidence. The result proved is, in effect, a special case of 
this more general principle. When one learns ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn one is obliged to 
take seriously only those disjuncts that would be the most normal, given the existing 
evidence. That is just to say that one is obliged to take seriously only the falsity of 
those members of {P1, P2, … , Pn} for which the existing evidence provides the least 
normic support.
The Principle of Differential Defeat is also an instance of another more gen-
eral principle, validated by the normic theory, regarding the effect of learn-
ing ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn upon the degree of justification enjoyed by each proposi-
tion in {P1, P2, … , Pn} . The degree to which a proposition  Px ∈ {P1, P2, … , Pn} is 
normically supported by evidence E is equal to the number of spheres of E-worlds 
throughout which  Px holds. The degree to which a proposition  Px ∈ {P1, P2, … , Pn} 
is normically supported by E ∧
(
̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn
)
 is equal to the number of 
spheres of E ∧
(
̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn
)
-worlds throughout which  Px holds. If m is the 
degree to which E normically supports the least normically supported propositions 
in {P1, P2, … , Pn} then m is the number of spheres of E-worlds throughout which 
P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ Pn is true, and the number of spheres that disappear when we move 
from evidence E to evidence E ∧
(
̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn
)
 . In this case, the effect of 
learning ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn is to lower the degree of normic support for each prop-
osition in {P1, P2, … , Pn} by m. According to the normic theory of justification, 
learning that one member of a set of justified propositions is false will uniformly 
lower the degree of justification for each proposition in the set. In one sense, the new 
evidence serves to ‘partially defeat’ the justification for each proposition, but will 
only (completely) defeat—that is, lower to 0—the justification for those propositions 
16 What if one receives only a defeasible report to the effect that ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 as in Ryan’s third 
version of the preface paradox discussed in n3? Such cases are more complex, and I provide only a 
preliminary treatment here: Suppose one has evidence E that normically supports a proposition P and 
acquires evidence F that normically supports ~P. Given certain conditions, this new evidence will defeat 
one’s normic support for P just in case the degree to which F normically supports ~P is greater than or 
equal to the degree to which E normically supports P. The conditions in question are that E and F be 
equally normal propositions and that F hold in some of the most normal worlds in which E and ~P hold 
and E hold in some of the most normal worlds in which F and P hold. What this ensures, in a way, is that 
there is no extraneous normic interaction between E and F beyond that which is mandated by their levels 
of respective normic support for the conflicting propositions P and ~P.
 Ryan’s third version of the preface paradox arguably fits this pattern, with one’s prior evidence normi-
cally supporting P1 ∧ P2 ∧… ∧ P100 , and the report normically supporting ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 . As men-
tioned in n3, Ryan suggests that, if one has evidence that justifies every claim in the book, one would not 
be justified in believing the report and ought to dismiss it. According to the normic theory, this diagnosis 
may be correct provided that the degree to which the report provides justification for ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 
is lower than the degree to which one’s prior evidence provides justification for the least justified of 
{P1, P2, … , P100} . Otherwise, the report will succeed in defeating one’s justification for some of the 
claims in the book.
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which were the least justified to begin with. It is only these propositions that, as it 
were, completely buckle under the weight of the new evidence.17
As well as validating Closure and offering viable Closure-preserving solutions 
to the lottery and preface paradoxes, the normic theory of justification validates the 
Principle of Differential Defeat and offers a viable Closure-preserving solution to 
the hybrid paradox. While this completes the primary aim of the paper, in the final 
section I turn briefly to a related topic, which also stems from the work of Backes 
(2019b); an objection to the normic theory of justification which focusses on the 
way in which it handles defeaters.
6  The Problem of ‘Easy Defeat’
Suppose Helen has a peanut allergy. One day she goes into a café and orders a 
brownie that is labelled ‘peanut free’. Helen believes that the brownie is peanut 
free, and this proposition is normically supported by her evidence. Suppose Helen 
then reads in the newspaper that a flour supplier has just announced that a bag of 
peanut-contaminated flour mistakenly made it into circulation. According to Backes 
(2019b), this will serve to defeat the normic support for Helen’s belief because it 
provides a possible explanation as to how the brownie might contain traces of pea-
nut, in spite of the label. If this is right, then the normic theory predicts that, once 
Helen reads the newspaper report, she is no longer justified in believing that the 
brownie is peanut free. Backes claims that this is a counterintuitive result—after 
all, it is extremely unlikely that any of the contaminated flour would have made its 
way into Helen’s brownie. Backes goes on to outline several further cases of ‘easy 
defeat’, in which the normic theory allegedly makes it too easy for one’s justified 
beliefs to be defeated. I will consider two more of his cases here:
Suppose Helen believes that she will see her friend Bob when she travels to 
Oxfordshire next weekend. Suppose Bob has said that he will meet her and that 
he is usually very reliable and trustworthy and, as a result, her evidence provides 
normic support for her belief. Suppose Helen then reads in the newspaper that a 
man in Oxfordshire has been fatally struck by lightning. According to Backes, 
this serves to defeat the normic support for Helen’s belief, and for a similar rea-
son to the preceding case; the new information could offer a possible explanation 
as to how she could fail to see Bob, in spite of her present evidence. Once again, 
if this is right then the normic theory predicts that, after reading the newspaper, 
17 Consider again the situation described in n8 and n13 in which one has equal justification for believing 
each of a series of propositions P1, … , Pn , and ‘slightly’ more justification for believing a further propo-
sition  Pn+1. If one learns ̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃Pn+1 then, as discussed, the normic theory will predict that one 
will lose justification for believing each of P1…Pn , but will retain justification for believing  Pn+1. In light 
of the observation made in the main text, however, the normic theory will also predict that the new infor-
mation will not affect the difference in one’s degree of justification for P1, … , Pn and for  Pn+1. Thus, if 
one’s initial justification for P1, … , Pn were just one degree lower than one’s justification for  Pn+1 then, 
while the latter justification won’t be defeated by the new information, it will be subject to partial defeat 
which reduces its degree of justification to 1. For more on partial defeat and the normic theory see Smith 
(2016, section 8.3).
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Helen would no longer have justification for believing that she will see Bob next 
weekend.
Finally, suppose that Helen has, for several years, owned an apartment in New 
York, when she reads in the newspaper that a New York apartment was recently gutted 
by fire. Plausibly, Helen would still be justified in believing that she has an apartment 
in New York. And yet, according to Backes, the normic theory predicts otherwise—
after all, this report offers a possible explanation as to how she could fail to have an 
apartment, despite her evidence, and thus deprives the belief of normic support.
One thing that we might observe right away is that these examples all appear to 
be somewhat similar to the example that drives the hybrid paradox. In the hybrid 
paradox, recall, I have secured evidence which normically supports each of 100 
independent factual claims P1, P2, … , P100 and I then learn that one of these claims 
is false—̃P1 ∨ ̃P2 ∨… ∨ ̃P100 . If we focus on one particular claim in the book—P57 
say—the new evidence might be thought to offer a kind of explanation as to how 
this claim could be false in spite of my existing evidence. And yet, as we have seen, 
it is not inevitable that the new information will defeat my normic support for  P57. 
By the result proved in the previous section, my normic support for  P57 will only be 
defeated on the assumption that it was one of the least normically supported of the 
100 claims.
In Backes’s examples, Helen doesn’t literally learn that one amongst a set of justi-
fied beliefs is false—but she does acquire evidence which can be accommodated in 
a number of different ways, some of which may count as more normal, given her 
existing evidence, than others. Suppose one’s evidence E provides normic support 
for P and one then learns D. If there is a proposition Q that entails D and which 
would be more normal, given E, than ̃P , then D will not defeat one’s normic support 
for P. We might say, in this case, that Q insulates P from defeat by D. Proof Suppose 
E normically supports P and suppose there is a world in which E and Q are true 
which is more normal than the most normal worlds in which E is true and P is false. 
Suppose finally that Q entails D. In this case, there is a world in which E and D are 
true which is more normal than the most normal worlds in which E is true and P is 
false. Ipso facto, P is true in the most normal worlds in which E and D are true and 
E ∧ D normically supports P. □
Consider again Backes’ apartment example. On the normic theory, the informa-
tion that an apartment in New York has been gutted by fire will only defeat Helen’s 
justification for believing that she has an apartment in New York on the assumption 
that it would be just as normal, given her evidence, for her apartment to be gutted 
by fire as any other. But we have no reason to accept this—and it would take little 
to make it false. There are many factors that determine an apartment’s vulnerability 
to fire. Some apartments are fitted with smoke alarms and sprinkler systems while 
others will lack them. Some apartments will have old, deteriorated electrical wir-
ing, while others will have new wiring that has passed rigorous safety checks. Some 
apartments will have open fireplaces, while others won’t, and so on. For any apart-
ment to be gutted by fire may require explanation, but more explanation is required 
in the case of some apartments than others.
It would be natural to suppose that Helen is aware that her apartment has certain 
fire safety measures that are not present in every apartment in New York. While 
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this evidence does leave open the possibility that Helen’s apartment is the one that 
burned, it generates the need for further explanation in this case. Upon reading that 
a New York apartment has been gutted by fire, it would be natural for Helen to reas-
sure herself with the thought that she has fire safety measures in place—a sprinkler 
system, wiring that has undergone safety checks etc. In this case, there is a proposi-
tion that insulates Helen’s belief from defeat—the proposition that there is an apart-
ment in New York that lacks appropriate fire safety measures and was recently gut-
ted by fire. It would be more normal, given Helen’s evidence, for this proposition to 
be true than for her belief to be false.
Similar remarks may apply to the Bob example (though matters are admittedly 
less clear-cut). Upon reading that a man in Oxfordshire has been fatally struck by 
lightning, it would be natural for Helen to reassure herself with the thought that Bob 
is relatively safety conscious and not the sort of person who would venture outside 
during a thunderstorm etc. The proposition that someone in Oxfordshire, more reck-
less than Bob, has been fatally struck by lightning would plausibly insulate Helen’s 
belief from defeat. Once again, it would be more normal, given Helen’s evidence, 
for this proposition to be true than for her belief to be false.
We could, of course, adjust these examples in such a way that there is no propo-
sition that will insulate Helen’s beliefs from defeat. We could stipulate that, given 
Helen’s evidence, one of the most normal ways in which the fire report could be 
true is for her own apartment to have burned, and one of the most normal ways in 
which the lightning report could be true is for Bob to have been struck. Perhaps 
Helen knows that her apartment is highly vulnerable to fire—perhaps she has rea-
son to believe that it is amongst the most vulnerable in New York. Perhaps Helen 
knows that Bob is well and truly reckless enough to venture out during a thunder-
storm—perhaps she has reason to believe that he is amongst the most reckless, in 
this regard, in all of Oxfordshire. In this case, the normic theory would predict, as 
Backes claims, that the justification for Helen’s beliefs is indeed defeated by the 
reports—but such a prediction is not obviously wrong.
With the examples fleshed out in this way, there is no available thought with 
which Helen could reassure herself—she would be forced to concede that her apart-
ment is one of those that could most easily have burned, and that Bob is one of those 
who could most easily have been struck. Such realisations would sit very uneasily 
alongside the beliefs that she has an apartment in New York and that she will be 
meeting Bob next weekend, if she persists in holding them. Consider the tension 
involved in uttering ‘Someone in Oxfordshire has been fatally struck by lightning 
and, knowing Bob, it could just as easily have been him as anyone else, but I’ll be 
meeting Bob next weekend’. In such a case, it’s natural to think that Helen ought to 
fall back upon a probabilistic belief—it’s very likely that she’ll be meeting Bob next 
weekend or some such—until she has had an opportunity to gather more informa-
tion, by contacting Bob or reading more details in the paper etc.
The problem with these two examples—a hazard of thought experiments more 
generally—is that the predictions and the intuitions that are supposedly being com-
pared both turn, in part, upon details that are not explicitly supplied. In each exam-
ple, Helen will have further background evidence that is potentially relevant to her 
belief, and to the interpretation of the new information that she receives. In each 
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case, the kind of background evidence that we would naturally assume to be at Hel-
en’s disposal will be enough to ensure that the normic support for her belief is insu-
lated and is not defeated by this new information.
This leaves only Backes’s first example. In this case, I am inclined to think that 
the normic support for Helen’s belief genuinely is defeated. When Helen reads about 
the bag of peanut-contaminated flour, what she learns is that, in all likelihood, some 
small proportion of baked goods in the city will contain this flour. Given her lim-
ited evidence, it would be just as normal for the brownie before her to be part of 
this group as any other baked good in the city. Backes claims that Helen should 
still be justified in believing that her brownie is peanut free—but is this really so 
clear? After reading the report, it would be understandable if Helen decided not to 
eat the brownie. And, if Helen did go ahead and eat the brownie as planned, there is 
some temptation to see this as a rash decision—particularly if her allergy is severe. 
It would also be irresponsible for Helen to assert that the brownie is peanut free or 
to offer some to a friend who also has a peanut allergy. Helen’s new evidence does, 
then, make a significant difference as to how she ought to behave—no longer should 
she blithely act as though the brownie is peanut-free. A natural explanation for this 
is that Helen’s new evidence also makes a difference as to what she should believe—
she should no longer believe that the brownie is peanut free.
Backes describes Helen’s new information as ‘negligible’ (p. 2885)—but many, I 
suspect, would be inclined to take such information very seriously. If the café own-
ers were made aware of the report, one could easily imagine them strongly advising 
Helen not to eat the brownie—offering her a refund or an exchange for a flour-free 
item. In real food contamination or tampering scares, the proportion of products 
affected is typically very small—but the measures taken are often drastic, including 
mass product recalls and dire public health warnings.18
In any case, it is not just the normic theorist who must accept that the justifica-
tion for Helen’s belief is defeated in this case—any defender of Closure is commit-
ted to this. Suppose that Helen were still justified in believing that her brownie is 
peanut free, and contains no peanut-contaminated flour. Helen should also be justi-
fied in believing that the brownie sitting unpurchased on the shelf does not contain 
peanut-contaminated flour, and believing the same about the blueberry muffin next 
to it and the cinnamon swirl at the café across the street and so on. If Helen encoun-
tered every baked good in the city, she could justifiably believe, of each one, that it 
does not contain peanut-contaminated flour. Given Closure, Helen would be justified 
in believing that none of the baked goods in the city contains peanut contaminated 
18 In September 2018, the discovery of sewing needles concealed in supermarket strawberries trig-
gered a nationwide panic in Australia. In a reaction that is very typical of such cases, strawberries were 
withdrawn from supermarket shelves and consumers were strongly advised to dispose of or return any 
strawberries purchased. At the time of the initial reaction, only a few affected strawberries had been 
discovered, out of the millions consumed on a weekly basis in Australia (in the end there were over 
100 reported cases). See for instance: https ://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-18/straw berry -fund-set-up-
for-farme rs-qld-premi er-says/10262 804 and https ://www.abc.net.au/news/rural /2018-09-19/straw berry 
-growe rs-claim -gover nment -causi ng-hyste ria-needl e/10282 070.
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flour. Given the newspaper report, it is clear that she does not have justification for 
believing this.
7  Conclusion
This paper has, in one way, been an extended exercise in exploring the consequences 
of preserving the Closure principle for justification. The lottery and the preface par-
adoxes both highlight certain commitments that any defender of Closure must be 
prepared to undertake—and so it is with the new hybrid paradox described by Prao-
lini and Backes. I have argued that the primary lesson of the new paradox is that a 
Closure defender is under significant pressure to accept what I have called the Prin-
ciple of Differential Defeat. The formal framework that I have set out demonstrates 
one way in which this principle could be embedded within a broad and systematic 
approach to epistemic justification—an approach which brings a range of further 
principles, such as Comparative Closure and the Minimum Conjunct Rule, as well 
as principles regarding partial defeat and insulation. For a Closure denier, the new 
paradox represents a powerful addition to one’s arsenal. For a Closure defender, the 
paradox is valuable in another way—for revealing more of the rich network of prin-
ciples of which Closure is but one part.
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